Market abuse by Alcock, A
 
MARKET ABUSE 
 
On 1st December 2001, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(‘FSMA’) came into force. One of its most controversial sections is Part 
VIII which gives the Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’) the power to 
impose civil penalties for market abuse. Despite the many doubts raised 
about these provisions and their as yet untested nature, the European 
Commission has proposed a European Directive on Market Abuse1, to 
extend the concept of ‘administrative sanctions’ for market abuse across 
the whole European Economic Area (‘EEA’). This paper looks at the 
issues currently raised by the UK legislation and any further problems 
the European legislation may bring. 
 
Background  
 
Until now, the UK has largely relied on criminal sanctions against any forms 
of market abuse, namely: 
 
1. The common law crime of conspiracy to defraud to cover rigging a 
1market; 
2. The statutory offences of ‘misleading statements’ and ‘market 
manipulation’, re-enacted in FSMA as ‘misleading statements and 
practices’; and 
3. Separate legislation making insider dealing a criminal offence2.  
 
All these criminal sanctions have been retained in the new regime and the FSA 
given the power to prosecute the statutory offences3.  However the 
Government was dissatisfied with reliance upon the criminal law. Proving the 
elements of these crimes ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ meant few successful 
prosecutions. So the FSA has also been given the power to reprimand and/or 
fine authorised and non-authorised persons for ‘market abuse’ based on a civil 
burden of proof. As the Economic Secretary put it:  
 
‘There is a gap in the protections [of the financial markets]. The 
criminal law covers all market participants, but only a narrow range of 
serious criminal offences. The regulatory regime is capable of dealing 
with a wider range of damaging behaviours, but applies only to the 
regulated community’4.  
 
However, Part VIII of FSMA had a rough passage through Parliament5 and 
the FSA’s Code of Market Conduct (‘Market Code’) an equally rough passage 
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through the required consultation process thereafter6.  The issues raised fell 
into three areas: 
 
1. the width of the basic definition in FSMA; 
2. the extent to which the Market Code and any safe-harbours reduced that 
width; and 
3. the protections from unfair or inappropriate enforcement. 
 
To those must now be added the problems that may be encountered under the 
proposed European Directive. 
 
1. Definition of Market Abuse 
 
Market abuse is basically defined as: 
 
1. behaviour (action or inaction) anywhere in the world, directly or indirectly 
affecting investments traded on a UK market7; 
2. that is likely to be regarded by regular users of the market as falling below 
the standard reasonably expected of a person in that position8; and 
3. which is at least one of three types: 
a. based on information not generally available to the market but which is 
likely to be regarded by a regular user as relevant in deciding the terms 
on which to deal in such investments (ie insider dealing);  
b. likely to give a regular user a false or misleading impression as to the 
market or value of such investments (ie misleading statements and 
practices); or 
c. regarded by a regular user as likely to distort the market in such 
investments (ie rigging the market)9. 
 
It is also indirect market abuse if a person requires or encourages (by action or 
inaction) another to engage in behaviour that, if done by the defendant, would 
have amounted to direct market abuse. Market abuse can thus be committed 
via an innocent third party and, indeed by one or more persons acting 
together10. 
 
Although the three types of market abuse are similar to the underlying crimes, 
their scope is not identical. In particular, the definitions are objective. No 
intent, recklessness or actual knowledge needs to be proved. The overarching 
standard being applied is that of this hypothetical regular user, a sort of expert 
‘man on the Clapham omnibus’ and what he is ‘likely to’ think. ‘Likely to’, 
here as elsewhere in the definition, may just mean ‘could’ and such a weak 
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causal link does seem to be the FSA’s initial interpretation11. This wide 
drafting is deliberate and gives rise to serious definitional problems.  
 
Information which ‘can be obtained by research or analysis by or on behalf of 
users of a market’ is deemed to be ‘generally available’12 which gives some 
protection for market analysts in respect of the first type of market abuse. But 
unlike proving the crime of insider dealing, information does not have to be 
‘known’ to be non-public and from an inside source13. It just has to amount to 
an informational advantage that a regular user of the market could consider 
relevant and reasonable not to expect the person to exploit. That still leaves 
plenty of scope for argument between those, like the Supreme Court in the 
United States, that believe that ‘market abuse’ must involve some exploitation 
of a breach of confidence, and those like the European Commission who 
believe that almost any exploitation of an informational advantage will do14. 
  
An example of the second type of market abuse was given in the 
Parliamentary Debates. If an internet user publishes a false announcement 
about a company that, for example, it is going to face a massive compensation 
suit, just so as to destroy the company’s share price, the person would have 
engaged in market abuse. The fact that he might not stand to gain financially is 
irrelevant15. However, this example is based on intent. Other examples given 
in the same debates, like mistakes in, or complete failures to make, company 
announcements, trading reports etc are often not going to be deliberate and the 
extension of market abuse to inaction can give rise to some very difficult 
judgments. For example, the Economic Secretary said: 
 
‘Someone who squeezes the market may not take any action, but 
merely by continuing to hold a particular position, could be involved in 
an abuse.’16 
 
Squeezing or cornering a market is probably the clearest example of the third 
type of market abuse, which otherwise tends to overlap with the second type. 
One particular problem here is that for commodity derivatives, the underlying 
market is often naturally dominated by a small number of producers. The 
Economic Secretary did not believe that a strike by workers of any such 
producer would breach the standard of behaviour expected by regular users of 
a UK market17. That is rather a remote example, but the major producers 
themselves will often have better information, will be wanting to keep their 
long or short positions hidden, will expect super profits from any quasi- 
monopolistic positions etc. What amounts to acceptable exploitation of such 
strong bargaining positions as against market abuse? As the FSA itself has 
pointed out in its Consultation Paper 10, it is hard to distinguish ‘wash trades’ 
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from normal repos and riskless principal trades; ‘abusive squeezes’ from bona 
fide speculation and super profits from monopolies; ‘misleading markets’ 
from spreading or acting on rumours; and ‘misuse of information’ from good 
research and market-making. The facts in R v The Securities and Futures 
Authority Ltd, ex p Fleurose (‘Fleurose’)18, a case decided under the old 
regime, are illustrative. 
 
JP Morgan Securities Ltd stood to lose nearly £1/2 million on some options if 
the FTSE-100 closed above 4842 on 28 November 1997. Twenty minutes 
before the close it stood at 4856, but at the close it was at 4832. The Stock 
Exchange discovered that JP Morgan had put in orders to sell parcels of shares 
in the five largest companies in the FTSE-100 during the final eight minutes of 
trading. The firm was fined £350,000 for breach of Stock Exchange rule 2.10 
through ‘… conduct the sole intention of which was to move the index value’. 
This rule requires an intention and the manager of the department had clearly 
given instructions to deal with that purpose. 
 
The question then became whether the trader who had executed the deals had 
breached the FSA’s Statements of Principles 1 and 3 on high standards of 
integrity, market conduct and fair dealing which the Securities and Futures 
Authority (‘SFA’) imposed on all their registered dealers. The case was a 
judicial review of the SFA’s disciplinary procedures and raised some 
interesting points about the European Convention on Human Rights dealt with 
below. What is of interest here is that the trader’s defence which was 
summarised (at para 74) thus: 
 
‘This case is about intent and knowledge. [The applicant] strongly 
denies any impropriety. His case is that he did not have the intention or 
motive of depressing the FTSE-100 Index, and that at all times he was 
acting on the instructions of his superior… and that, at all times, he 
believed he was participating in the unwinding of a hedge.’ 
 
What is noteworthy about this case, is that in this disciplinary action brought 
under the old regime against an authorised firm and registered employees (ie 
market insiders), their intent and knowledge was treated as crucial. Prima 
facie, under the new regime and market abuse, actions can be brought even 
against market outsiders without such proof of intent or knowledge. However, 
as market abuse cases can only be brought by the FSA, much will depend on 
how it uses this incredibly wide discretion. That may be gleaned from its 
Market Code. 
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Before looking at Code, however, there are two general defences created by 
FSMA, where a defendant: 
 
1. believed, on reasonable grounds, that the behaviour did not amount to 
direct or indirect market abuse; or 
2. took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid 
engaging in direct or indirect market abuse. 
 
The onus is on the defendant in representations to the FSA to show that ‘there 
are reasonable grounds for it to be satisfied’ that the defences are met. It is not 
clear that these defences are of any great use since to show a reasonable belief 
or due diligence will generally require one to show that the danger of market 
abuse was actively considered in the first place. This is borne out by the 
considerations the FSA has been required to list in its Enforcement Manual19. 
The one useful factor seems to be showing there was consultation with the 
FSA, other authorities or lawyers before embarking on any questionable 
activity. 
 
2. The Market Code and Safe Harbours 
 
FSMA only defines the outer limits of what can constitute market abuse. The 
FSA is required to draw up a Market Code, in effect evidential rules, to help 
determine whether or not behaviour does amount to market abuse20. The 
purpose of the Market Code is to allow the FSA the sort of flexibility that the 
non-statutory Takeover Panel has to adapt and amend its rules in the face of 
rapidly changing market practices.  
 
FSMA does give the FSA various powers to create safe harbours, specifying 
behaviour that will definitely not amount to market abuse. The FSA has 
granted safe harbours for compliance with its stabilisation rules, its Chinese 
wall provisions, some of the Listing Rules and some of the Takeover Rules. It 
has also listed nine specific safe harbours in the Market Code21. Otherwise the 
Code ‘may be relied upon so far as it indicates whether or not that behaviour 
should be taken to amount to market abuse’22. The Market Code concentrates 
on elucidating the ‘regular user test’ and the three types of market abuse, 
which it refers to as ‘misuse of information’, ‘false and misleading 
impressions’ and ‘distortion’. 
Regular user test 
 
The Market Code confirms that the regular user test is hypothetical. Even if a 
particular market accepts behaviour falling within one of the three types of 
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abuse, it can still be market abuse23. The FSA believes this will be an 
exceptional situation and is more likely to lead to new guidance for the future 
than enforcement against past actions. The rules and normal practices of the 
markets (including overseas markets) will always be taken into account and 
will usually be taken as indicating what is legitimate behaviour.  
 
The Market Code also confirms the objective nature of the regular user test 
and that abuse does not generally require ‘an intention or purpose to be present 
in order for behaviour to fall below the objective standards’24. This does allow 
cases to be brought against firms without difficult issues of attribution, 
although rather grudgingly the Market Code (at para 1.2.6) admits: 
 
‘A mistake is unlikely to fall below the objective standards expected 
where the person in question has taken reasonable care to prevent and 
detect the occurrence of such mistakes.’ 
 
The test does not impose a uniform standard. It varies according to the 
person’s experience, skill and level of knowledge and the markets and 
investments concerned. For example, the FSA seems to accept that disclosure 
standards in equity markets are generally higher than in commodities markets. 
On the other hand it is more reluctant to accept behaviour permitted in an 
overseas market but affecting a UK market, if the behaviour would not have 
been permitted in the UK market directly25. This is presumably because it 
fears regulatory arbitrage by global firms. 
Misuse of information 
 
To be misuse of information, four conditions have to be met: 
 
(1) The information must be ‘one of the reasons’ for the behaviour26. 
 
(2) The information must not be ‘generally available’. The FSA has listed the 
same sorts of factors for determining this as are listed for determining 
whether information is ‘public’ under the insider dealing legislation. The 
observation of public events is added to diligent research as being 
generally available, even if through lack of resources or opportunity 
neither is available to others27. 
 
(3) The information must be ‘relevant’. The Market Code does not require 
information to be specific or precise or indeed price-sensitive, but they are 
factors that the FSA will consider along with how current and reliable 
(near to the source) it is and what other information is available. Where 
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‘soft information’ about the future is concerned, the significance of the 
information and its apparent level of certainty will be important. The 
information does not have to emanate from a source connected to the 
investments affected, eg it can be official information or information about 
the supplies of a commodity28. 
 
(4) The information must be of the type where disclosure (now or in the 
future) would reasonably be expected, either because: 
 
(a) there is a legal or regulatory requirement, eg listing or transparency 
rules (‘disclosable information’); or 
(b) it is publicly announced routinely, eg changes in interest rate or in 
published credit ratings (‘announceable information’)29. 
 
This fourth condition does narrow the scope of the statutory definition. For 
example, in the commodity derivatives markets generally with low disclosure 
requirements, dealers who are suppliers of the underlying commodity will 
often have an informational advantage that just has to be accepted by regular 
users, even if such an informational advantage would not be acceptable in an 
equities market. Also, since market surveys, research documents and 
journalists’ newspaper tips are not disclosable or announceable, they can 
presumably be front-run30. 
 
The FSA has specified five safe harbours in respect of misuse of information: 
 
(1) The deal was required by a legal or regulatory of contractual obligation. 
 
(2) The deal was not based on or influenced by the information, eg because 
there was  a Chinese Wall operating  
 
(3) The information is trading information (ie that someone intends to deal), 
unless it is about a possible takeover bid or primary market activity. Front-
running customers orders (unless part of a possible takeover, placement or 
new issue) will not, therefore, be market abuse, although it will be a breach 
of the Conduct of Business Rules for authorised firms and possibly the 
crime of insider dealing. 
 
(4) The information is information about acquiring or disposing of an equity 
stake (including a takeover), but the dealing is for or on behalf of the 
potential offeror and for the sole purpose of pursuing the principal 
transaction. This allows stakebuilding, irrevocable undertakings, and 
arranging cash alternatives before a takeover, but does not allow dealing 
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aimed at providing financial protection, eg selling a put option that will not 
lead to delivery of the stock to the potential offeror. 
 
(5) Agreeing to underwrite31. 
 
It should be noted that under misuse of information, unlike the crime of insider 
dealing, it is not a defence that the person did not expect a profit to be made 
(or loss avoided) from the information.  
False or misleading impression 
 
The Market Code lists four categories of such behaviour: 
 
1. Artificial transactions – There is an amazingly complex definition based 
on the objective ‘principal effect’ being to produce a false or misleading 
impression, whether deliberately or negligently, but with a subjective 
defence of having a legitimate ‘principal rationale’. The FSA lists a 
number of factors that it will take into account, like whether the 
transaction causes a brief price fluctuation and what interest the person 
might have in that fluctuation32. 
 
2. Disseminating information - Here the abusive behaviour is that a person 
disseminates relevant information which he knows, or ought to know, is 
false or misleading where an actuating purpose is to create a false or 
misleading impression. Again a factor that will be taken into account is 
whether the person has an interest in any affected investment33.  
 
This is an odd definition since it is difficult to see how dissemination can 
have the purpose of creating a false or misleading impression if the person 
does not actually know that the information is false or misleading. The 
problem the FSA is struggling with is to distinguish between the inevitable 
passing on of market rumours and promulgating them to mislead. PR 
agents (even Government Press Officers) could find their informal 
activities caught under this heading. Their more formal activities may fall 
within the next.  
 
3. Dissemination of information through an accepted channel – Where 
information is to be disseminated, for example, through the Stock 
Exchange’s Regulatory News Service, the person responsible for its 
submission remains under a positive obligation to take reasonable care to 
ensure that it is not false or misleading. So, accidental misreporting of 
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transactions or figures could be market abuse unless the person can show 
he has taken sufficient care to try and prevent such mistakes34. 
 
4. Course of conduct – The test here is similar to that in 1. above, but covers 
a course of conduct other than transactions. Again there is a principal 
rationale defence. This heading is particularly relevant to commodity 
derivatives markets and the movements of stocks and transport of the 
underlying commodity35. 
 
The FSA has also specified three safe harbours in respect of false or 
misleading impressions: 
 
(1) certain regular market transactions like bed and breakfasts, arbitrage 
between different markets and stock-lending; 
(2) reporting legitimate transactions as required by law or regulation; 
(3) dissemination of false or misleading information by a firm through 
innocent employees (eg because of effective Chinese walls)36. 
Distortion 
 
The FSA itself has admitted in Consultation Paper 59 that it is incredibly 
difficult to distinguish the distortion of a market from normal market volatility 
caused by the interplay of major players in the market. Although this third 
type clearly overlaps with the second, there are two specific circumstances that 
the Market Code defines as distortion: 
 
(1) Price-positioning – where a person enters into a transaction or a series of 
transactions with an actuating purpose of distorting prices, ie moving them 
without a legitimate commercial rationale. This can be ramping prices of 
an investment or of a relevant index. Although this is most commonly 
done to profit (or avoid losses) on derivative positions, it might be to 
improve a manager’s quarterly performance figures37. 
 
(2) Abusive squeezes – where, with an actuating purpose of distorting prices, 
a person  
(a) has a significant influence over supply, demand or delivery 
mechanisms of a investment or the underlying product; and 
(b) directly or indirectly holds positions under which he expects delivery 
of them. 
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nable care to ensure 
e information is not inaccurate or misleading’. 
n 
been restricted to deliberately, or perhaps, recklessly misleading 
e market. 
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e 
t anyway and do not make up 
r the shortcomings in the original definition. 
xity of the Code, the FSA will give informal oral advice as 
situations arise.  
Having a significant influence over supply, indeed extracting ‘super-
normal’ profits thereby, is not of itself abusive. The abuse is cornering the 
market and then using the position to distort38. 
 
Again, in both cases, the Market Code lists a number of factors the FSA will 
consider. There is only one specified safe harbour, following the rules in the 
London Metal Exchange’s ‘Market Aberrations: The Way Forward’39. 
Conclusions on the Market Code 
 
One of the most significant features of the Market Code is that subjective 
knowledge and intention have crept back in to market abuse through concepts 
like the ‘principal rationale’ and an ‘actuating purpose’. However, knowledge 
of the status of information is not required to be guilty of misuse of 
information and innocent motives may not be a complete defence for those, 
like directors, responsible for disseminating false information through 
‘accepted channels’40. In this last case the Code notes (at para 1.5.20) that it 
is
‘…. appropriate that those who disseminate information through 
[accepted channels], for example, the company itself, its financial 
advisers or its public relations advisers, take reaso
th
 
This may seem appropriate, but as directors have discovered to their cost i
the US, hindsight is a wonderful thing, and that is in a jurisdiction where 
liability has 
th
  
In summary, market abuse through misuse of information, or disseminating 
false or misleading information through accepted channels, can be committed 
negligently. In other cases, defendants have either to show that their princ
motive was a proper one (ie having a legitimate ‘principal rationale’) or, 
which is probably harder, to rebut any suggestion of an improper motive (i
not having an illegitimate ‘actuating purpose’). In addition to these slight 
reductions to the original scope of market abuse, the FSA has created safe 
harbours. These, however, are mainly examples of circumstances that would 
not have passed the overarching regular user tes
fo
 
Given the comple
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3. Enforcement 
 
The FSA has a choice of sanctions which can be applied to anyone within and 
without the perimeter, namely: 
 
1. to prosecute through the courts for insider dealing, or for misleading 
statements and practices;  
2. to publicly reprimand or impose its own fines for market abuse; 
3. if the defendant is authorised or approved, to discipline for breaches of its 
principles and rules; or 
4. if the defendant is a member of a recognised market or clearing house, 
leave the matter to their disciplinary procedures41. 
 
The position is complicated further by the supplementary powers the FSA has 
to seek High Court injunctions and restitution, or in the case of market abuse, 
impose restitution itself42. 
 
There are at least three contentious issues arising from the FSA’s enforcement 
powers in respect of market abuse: 
 
1. Do they comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, 
particularly Articles 6 and 7 on fair procedures; 
2. Who should be responsible for dealing with market abuse arising during 
the course of a takeover; and 
3. In what circumstances should the FSA seek to impose a fine or restitution? 
The European Convention 
 
FSMA was one of the first pieces of legislation to come before Parliament 
since the partial incorporation of the European Convention into domestic UK 
law under the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’). The HRA 1998, section 
19 requires ministers to declare whether any new legislation is fully compliant 
with the Convention. This gave the City a wonderful opportunity to challenge 
the Government on whether the original disciplinary procedures proposed in 
FSMA met the requirements of Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention.  
 
Article 6(1) applies to all civil and criminal procedures and lays down that 
“…everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. At first sight this 
seems to be met by having the right to a full hearing before the Financial 
Services and Markets Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’) of any disciplinary or market 
abuse matter not settled with the FSA43. The remainder of Article 6 and 
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Article 7(1) appear only to apply to criminal proceedings. They require that a 
defendant: 
 
1. can have reasonably foreseen the legal consequences of his actions 
because the offence is sufficiently defined; 
2. is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty and maintain a privilege 
against self-incrimination; 
3. is properly informed of the nature of any charge and has time and facilities 
to prepare his defence;  
4. is allowed to defend himself or to be legally represented (free when the 
interests of justice so require); and 
5. can summon his own witnesses and cross-examine those against him44. 
 
Two issues arise from these articles: 
 
1. Does the Convention treat disciplinary proceedings of the sort contained in 
FSMA as civil or criminal? 
2. Even if they are civil, to what extent do the fair procedures specified for 
criminal proceedings, nevertheless apply to civil ones? 
 
The Government maintained that all the disciplinary procedures under FSMA 
would be viewed as civil. The City, through its legal representative, Lord 
Lester, maintained they were criminal. In the end, the Government reluctantly 
accepted that, proceedings against market abuse might be treated as criminal 
under the Convention. This led to three concessions limited to market abuse: 
 
1. a restriction on the use of compelled statements as evidence; 
2. the introduction of legal assistance; and 
3. a tightening up of the definition, including the introduction of safe 
harbours45.  
 
Was the Government right to concede on market abuse and market abuse 
alone? The decision in Fleurose seems to suggest yes. The case was conducted 
as though the HRA 1998 had been in force. Morison J reviewed the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on these issues and 
concluded that to decide whether proceedings were criminal or civil, a three-
stage test has to be applied: 
 
(1) Has the Contracting State classified the case as subject to 
disciplinary law or criminal law? 
(2) What is the nature of the offence charged? 
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(3) What is the nature and severity of the penalty that was or might 
have been imposed?46 
 
On the first test, SFA cases were (and now all FSA cases are) classified by the 
UK as disciplinary. On the third test, Morison J held (at para 50) that the fact 
that the SFA (and now the FSA) could impose an unlimited fine did not make 
the proceedings criminal: 
 
‘In the field of financial regulation, the size of the fine can, I think, 
fairly remain open. There is no doubt that some financial improprieties 
may cause millions of pounds of damage… The essential feature of the 
financial penalty imposed through the SFA disciplinary process is that 
it is recoverable only as a civil debt, without the possibility of recourse 
to the sanction of imprisonment for default or contempt of court.’ 
 
Penalties under FSMA remain a civil debt47. This leaves the second test. Here 
Morison J, following the Human Rights Commission’s view expressed in 
Wickramsinghe v UK48, said (at para 52): 
 
‘The core distinction in the classification process between what might, 
for shorthand, be called civil and criminal in Convention Law seems to 
me to rest on the fact that it is a necessary condition for the existence 
of a criminal charge that what is being alleged is a breach of a person’s 
obligations to the State arising from being a citizen, through laws 
which have universal application or whose application is not dependent 
upon an individual’s choice. Whereas, disciplinary cases involving a 
breach of obligations imposed on a class or group of individuals 
through their voluntary participation, do not fulfil the condition.’ 
 
Morison J therefore held the SFA’s procedures to be civil. As a body, the SFA 
did look more like a traditional professional association (like the BMA in 
Wickramsinghe) than does the FSA regulating 7% of the UK’s GDP. 
Nevertheless, when disciplining authorised and approved persons, the FSA’s 
procedures are also probably civil. However, for market abuse, the FSA has 
powers against the regulated and non-regulated and that probably tips the 
balance into making the procedures criminal. The Government was therefore 
wise to add the extra protections in for market abuse cases. 
 
If this is right, it suggests that, in order to avoid proceedings being treated as 
criminal, the FSA will bring actions for market abuse against authorised and 
approved person as breaches of its Principles and Rules (as the SFA did in 
Fleurose) rather than under the specific market abuse provisions. This, 
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however, may not gain the FSA a great deal. In Fleurose, Morison J went on 
to say, (at para 52): 
 
‘But after the distinction [between civil and criminal] is drawn, there 
may be some disciplinary procedures whose characteristics are so akin 
to criminal proceedings that the concept of fairness requires more or 
less the same protections in both.’ 
 
Certainly the European Court of Human Rights took the view in Albert & Le 
Compte v Belgium49 that in disciplinary procedures, the protections of a clear 
charge, time to prepare a defence and the right to call and cross-examine 
witnesses applied even if the proceedings were civil. In Fleurose, however, the 
issues were the vagueness of the FSA’s Principles, the right to legal 
representation, and the privilege against self-incrimination50. 
 
On the issue of vagueness, Morison J maintained at para 66 that this was 
common with provisions against professional misconduct, was perfectly 
acceptable and presumably will remain so under the new regime. On legal 
representation, he pointed out at para 62 that the European Court of Human 
Rights had only ever required this for courts, not tribunals. On self-
incrimination, he said (at para 59(2)): 
 
‘In pursuance of the need to protect the investing public, it is justifiable 
to require traders to co-operate with proper investigations. Indeed, the 
investigatory process itself is dependent upon answers given, and if 
answers could be refused on grounds of self-incrimination, or if given, 
those answers could not be used in a disciplinary case, then the 
regulatory authority would be hampered in its function of protecting 
the public and, effectively forced to continue to accept as a registered 
person someone who it knew was unfit to be so. That cannot be the 
rule.’ 
 
Such a pragmatic approach seems attractive, until one substitutes ‘suspected 
terrorist’ for ‘trader’ and ‘free’ for ‘registered’. 
Takeovers 
 
One of the most vociferous attacks against the FSA’s enforcement powers was 
launched by the Takeover Panel and pursued in Parliament by its former 
Chairman, Lord Alexander51. The fear was that during takeover bids, parties 
would either: 
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1. be reluctant to co-operate with the Takeover Panel, lest admissions later be 
used by the FSA to bring market abuse actions; or 
2. resort to the FSA and the courts rather than accept informal Takeover 
Panel rulings.  
 
The Government rejected the plea to carve out an area of responsibility for the 
Takeover Panel to determine issues of market abuse in takeovers and an 
Opposition proposal for a statutory safe harbour where the Takeover Panel 
was the arbiter of what amounted to conformity was narrowly defeated.  
 
However, the FSA has introduced into the Market Code a limited safe harbour 
for behaviour conforming to certain Takeover Code rules52. It has also agreed 
to consult with the Panel before exercising its market abuse powers in a way 
that could affect a takeover bid and refrain from intervening where the Panel 
can take effective action itself. In addition, to support the Takeover Panel, it 
has endorsed the Takeover Code, the Substantial Acquisition Rules, and any 
Takeover Panel rulings in respect of them, in effect making them FSA rules 
applying to firms conducting designated investment business. Finally, the FSA 
requires firms not to act for anyone whom they reasonably believe will not 
comply with the Takeover Code or Substantial Acquisition Rules53. 
 
Only time will tell whether the Economic Secretary was right to say: 
 
‘The Panel’s view will be highly persuasive in takeover matters. If 
disagreement arises, we believe that, as the statutory regulator in 
respect of market abuse, the FSA’s view should be the determining 
factor; however, we also believe that disagreement is most unlikely in 
such cases.’54  
When to Fine or Seek Restitution 
 
Breaches of the Market Code or failure to follow guidance issued by the FSA 
will not automatically lead to market abuse proceedings. The FSA has laid out 
the criteria that it will consider. Above all, the FSA has to decide whether the 
behaviour falls within one of the three categories covered by market abuse and 
falls below the standard expected by ‘a reasonable person who regularly deals 
on the market in investments of the kind in question’55. 
 
The FSA is required to publish a statement of policy on fining for market 
abuse just as it is for fining authorised firms and approved individuals, and as 
with disciplinary fining, it is reluctant to produce a tariff. The FSA’s has 
produced a list of factors: 
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1. the adverse effect on the market; 
2. the extent to which the behaviour was deliberate or reckless; 
3. whether the individual is an individual; 
4. the amount of profits accrued or loss avoided; 
5. conduct following the contravention; 
6. disciplinary record and compliance history; 
7. previous action taken by the FSA; and 
8. action taken by other regulatory authorities56. 
 
This is clearly aimed at calming some fears about the draconian nature of this 
power and limiting the levels of fines for individual negligence. To maintain 
orderly settlement in the market, the imposition of a fine does not make the 
transaction void or unenforceable57. Still, the person could be subject to a 
restitutionary claim. The FSA may only pursue such restitutionary claims for 
accrued profits or losses suffered ‘as a result’ of the contravention or market 
abuse on behalf of anyone ‘to whom the profits… are attributable; or who has 
suffered the loss or adverse effect’. There are also reasonable belief and due 
diligence defences58.  
 
Where the market has been positively mislead and others deal at too high or 
too low a price, the causal link is relatively straightforward. But where the 
abuse is misuse of information, it is often not clear who the victim is. Those 
dealing contemporaneously do not normally lose ‘as a result’ of the abuse. If 
anything, the price they will have obtained at that time will have been ‘more 
accurate’ than if no abuse had been taking place. Of course, the abuser may 
well have profited but are those profits ‘attributable’ to the contemporaneous 
dealers? 
 
The other possible claim could be on behalf of the party whose information 
was exploited, usually, but not necessarily, the issuer of the securities. This 
party has not usually lost anything. One case where a claim could be 
established is where a bidder is proposing to ‘sweep the market’ before 
launching the bid and the abuser has pre-empted it. It could then be claimed 
that by analogy with fiduciary duties, any profits made by the abuser are 
attributable to the bidder. 
 
The FSA has listed the factors that it will take into account before launching a 
restitutionary claim, such as the number of persons affected, the costs of any 
action, whether redress is available elsewhere and whether the losses are 
quantifiable and identifiable. On this last matter, it is not clear what the FSA’s 
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attitude, in particular to misuse of information cases, might be. It has in the 
past expressed the view that: 
 
‘The rationale for the proposed market abuse regime in the UK is… 
directed at protecting the integrity of market mechanisms, rather than 
protecting the interests of any particular group of market users…. We 
do not anticipate that the exercise of the FSA’s restitution powers 
would normally be appropriate for the purposes of disgorging profits 
for the benefit of, for example: 
 “Contemporaneous traders” – ie persons trading in the market at 
the some time as  person found to have been insider dealing or 
misusing information in a manner which constitutes market abuse 
 Companies or issuers whose investments have been the subject of 
manipulation, insider dealing or information misuse.’59 
 
Such a statement does not appear in the final Handbook, but the FSA may still 
be cautious about restitution in market abuse cases, not least because losses 
tend to be incurred by market professionals and the FSA does say: 
 
‘The number of instances in which the FSA might consider its power 
to obtain restitution for market counterparties (ie professionals) are 
likely to be limited.’60 
 
Still, this may not leave abusers entirely in the clear. One could see civil 
claims ‘piggy-backing’ on any successful market abuse actions the FSA may 
bring, as happens in the United States. 
 
Proposed European Directive 
 
One striking feature of Part VIII of FSMA that has gone largely unquestioned 
is its extraterritoriality. To be market abuse in the UK does not require any 
part of the behaviour to take place in the UK, only the effect to be on a UK 
market. This is clearly aimed at stopping individual operators acting from 
operating outside the jurisdiction or global players exploiting any 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Nevertheless, such ambitious regulatory 
claims can create large areas of overlapping, even contradictory regulation. 
Ever mindful of ‘competitive distortions’ to its beloved, albeit misconceived, 
‘level playing field’, the European Commission has proposed replacing the 
Directive on Insider Dealing with a Directive on Market Abuse (‘MA 
Directive’). 
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Following FSMA and the FSA’s Market Code, the Commission recognises 
three types of market abuse, misuse of information, false or misleading 
impressions, and distortion, but in the proposed Directive’s definitions, the 
first is still based on ‘inside information’ and the other two are merged under 
‘market manipulation’61. 
Inside Information 
 
Although the Commission refers to inside information as being ‘confidential 
information’, it has retained its wide definition of inside information, 
amounting to any material informational advantage obtained ‘by virtue of’ 
being a director, security holder, or ‘having access to the information through 
the exercise of [one’s] employment, profession or duties’62. It has removed the 
knowledge requirement for these primary insiders, although it is retained for 
tippees. Insider dealing is not confined to individuals, in possession of inside 
information about securities, themselves dealing, or procuring, recommending 
or disclosing to others, to deal on regulated markets63. It now covers: 
 
1. legal persons (companies etc); 
2. all financial derivatives including commodity derivatives; and 
3. primary markets and off-market transactions64. 
 
These extensions are not going to be easy to cope with, as can be seen from 
the problems the UK had implementing the old Insider Dealing Directive and 
in devising the current Market Code. Including legal persons raises difficult 
issues of knowledge attribution and Chinese walls. Markets in commodity 
derivatives are often dominated by major suppliers of the commodities who 
will always have informational advantages. Effective primary markets require 
the ability to bring in major investors to place and/or underwrite securities 
without premature publicity. 
 
To cut down the potential for insider dealing, ‘issuers of financial instruments’ 
will be under an obligation ‘to inform the public as soon as possible of inside 
information65. That is an understandable obligation that is already imposed on 
issuers of tradeable securities, but how will that work for commodity 
derivatives? 
 
The proposed Directive does recognise that there will have to be exemptions, 
for example, buy-backs, price stabilisation, public sector debt management66. 
Many of the details are left to the comitology (sic) procedures proposed by the 
Committee of Wise Men; ie rules left to the Commission to devise after taking 
advice from the European Securities Committee67. This does not fill one with 
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confidence, particularly as the proposed Directive already requires ‘issuers or 
entities acting on their behalf [to] establish a regularly updated list of those 
persons working for them and having access to inside information’ and those 
producing ‘research or other relevant information… to ensure that information 
is fairly presented and disclose their interests or indicate conflicts of 
interest…’68 
 
All of this reveals a deep misunderstanding of the way that markets operate on 
snippets of information, half-truths and pure rumour. The Commission’s 
misguided attachment to ‘the level playing field’ is going to make it deeply 
resistant to exemptions. Although the FSA will no doubt fight for an Anglo-
Saxon understanding of the way markets work, this European comitology 
procedure does threaten to render the elaborate consultation exercises required 
under FSMA otiose in the whole area of market abuse69. 
Market Manipulation 
 
Market manipulation is defined as: 
 
‘(a)Transactions or orders to trade, which give, or are likely to give, 
false or misleading signals as to the supply, demand or price of 
financial instruments, or which secure, by one or more persons acting 
in collaboration, the price of one or several financial instruments at an 
abnormal or artificial level, or which employ fictitious devices or any 
other form of deception or contrivance. 
 
(b)Dissemination of information through the media, including the 
Internet, or by any other means, which gives, or is likely to give, false 
or misleading signals as to the supply, demand or price of financial 
instruments, including the dissemination of rumours and false or  
misleading news.’70 
 
Paragraph (a) above clearly covers what are referred to in the Market Code as 
‘artificial transactions’ and ‘price-positioning’ and paragraph (b) more than 
covers ‘disseminating information’ whether informally or through accepted 
channels. Indeed, even innocently passing on any information that later turns 
out to be materially incomplete or untrue seems to be covered! The definition 
does not so clearly cover the Market Code’s ‘course of conduct’ and ‘abusive 
squeezes’, but such behaviour is in the attached non-exhaustive list of typical 
methods of market manipulation71.  
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These definitions are vague and, in particular, there is no clarity about the 
mens rea required or indeed any indication that such issues will be clarified, 
although the Commission can use the comitology procedures to amend the 
definitions and the attached list. Again one takes little comfort from the 
Commission’s view that the ‘adaptation and clarification of the definitions and 
exemptions’ are ‘non-essential technical implementing details’72. As the FSA 
fully understands, when it comes to distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate 
transactions in a market based system ‘the devil is in the detail’. 
 
One other provision on market manipulation has caused great excitement, the 
power to act against journalists for market abuse. Member States do not have 
to implement provisions specifically against journalists front-running 
recommendations or misleading the market by reporting information that turns 
out to be false or misleading. The FSA, by its definition of ‘disclosable’ and 
‘announceable’ information and its distinction between the obligations on 
those disseminating information through an accepted channel and others, has 
clearly tried to avoid dragging journalists in to the market abuse regime. 
Presumably it will try to maintain that stance. However, unless the general 
definitions and examples in the proposed Directive are clarified, journalists 
may be brought in. If they are caught, the UK could use the special provision 
on journalists to exempt their activities again73. Of what worth such a special 
exemption may be to Financial Times journalists read throughout Europe, 
would still depend upon the provisions adopted by other Member States.  
Other Provisions 
 
On the issue of territoriality, the proposed Directive requires Member States at 
least to deal with actions undertaken within their territory, although this does 
not appear to rule out the wider approach taken by the UK. Indeed, there are 
quite elaborate provisions to be supplemented under the comitology procedure 
on pan-European co-operation74. 
 
As to enforcement, the proposed Directive does push the Treaty of Rome 
provisions to their limits. The Commission has commented: 
 
‘In principle it is unacceptable in an integrated financial market for 
wrongful conduct to incur a heavy penalty in one country, a light one 
in another and no penalty in a third. However, a full harmonisation of 
penal sanctions is not foreseen in the EC Treaty.’75 
 
The proposed Directive requires there to be a ‘single administrative authority 
competent to ensure that the provisions of the Directive are applied’ with 
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suitable investigative powers, although constrained by any legal requirements 
on confidentiality and subject to ‘the right to apply to the courts’76. The 
controversial provision is Article 14 which requires there to be criminal and 
administrative sanctions that are ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’, 
albeit, ‘in conformity with their national law’. As the Commission concedes, 
that national law will, for all Member States, have to comply with their 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, which brings us 
back to Fleurose77. 
 
In a global market like that for financial services, there are advantages for 
those involved in having a common regulatory approach that operates over as 
wide an area as possible. However, the proposed Directive only lays down a 
basic minimum standard, albeit one to be fleshed out by the comitology 
procedure. As the Commission admits: 
 
‘The new disciplinary framework set out by this Directive is not 
intended to replace the national provisions by directly applicable 
Community provisions, but contribute towards helping some 
convergence among the different national regimes through compliance 
with the requirements of the Directive.’ 
 
Such convergence will be of no value at all, unless the Directive and the 
Commission’s subsequent details take account of the problems the UK has 
already had in legislating in this area and any adjustments that the FSA may 
yet have to make, once the market abuse provisions have operated here for a 
period. Refining the UK provisions has required lengthy and detailed 
consultation with practitioners. After the failure to secure the 13th Company 
Law Directive on Takeovers, one senses a degree of desperation on the part of 
the Commission to make fast progress on both this Directive and the one on 
Prospectuses78. Both are highly controversial and if the Commission is not 
careful, Member States and their citizens may lose faith in its ability to deal 
with this area altogether.  
 
.Alistair Alcock, Professor of Corporate Law, University of Buckingham, 
formerly Director, Corporate Finance at UBS-Phillips & Drew. 
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